US Tariffs on Brazil: Understanding the 25% and 12.5% Duties on Brazilian Products
- Camila Hermano
- 7 hours ago
- 7 min read
Over the past few weeks, I've received many questions from clients and entrepreneurs in Goiás about the same subject.
New US import tariffs on Brazilian products have been raising questions among exporting companies across several sectors. Two new tariffs, two different acronyms, two percentages that stack on top of each other. And one question comes up in every conversation: why exactly did the United States apply these measures, and on what basis?
This article is not a headline summary. It's an organized explanation, built for anyone who needs to understand the legal rationale behind each US import tariff, in order to make concrete decisions about contracts, pricing, and export logistics to the United States.
In summary
There are two separate US tariffs on Brazilian products, approved at different times and through different processes.
They rest on distinct legal grounds: the 25% duty comes from a Section 301 investigation into trade practices; the 12.5% duty comes from a separate investigation into forced labor.
The two can stack, reaching 37.5% on the same product.
Not every product was affected: each tariff has its own list of exclusions.
Ongoing export contracts should be reviewed to determine who bears the cost of the tariff.
Two tariffs, two investigations, two legal grounds
The first point that tends to cause confusion is assuming this is a single measure. It isn't.
These are two distinct tariffs, approved at different moments, based on different investigations, and which stack on top of each other over a significant share of Brazilian exports.
To understand this, it's worth briefly revisiting the timeline.
February 2026 — The US Supreme Court invalidates the use of the emergency economic law (IEEPA) as grounds for broad tariffs against Brazil. The old 10% reciprocal tariff and the 40% surcharge fall. Steel and aluminum tariffs, based on a different legal provision, remain in place.
Same day — The US government establishes a temporary global tariff of 10%, valid for 150 days, now grounded in a different provision of the 1974 trade law.
July 22, 2026 — The new 25% tariff on Brazil takes effect, based on Section 301.
July 24, 2026 — An additional 12.5% tariff takes effect, stemming from a separate investigation into forced labor, replacing the temporary global tariff that was expiring that same day.
It was within this window that the two new tariffs specific to Brazil were finalized and entered into force.
The first layer: the 25% tariff, based on Section 301
The 25% tariff took effect on July 22, 2026, following an investigation of roughly one year conducted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), based on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Section 301 allows the United States to apply retaliatory tariffs when it believes a trading partner's practices unjustifiably burden or restrict American commerce. This is not a generic reciprocal tariff, but a targeted measure, based on specific allegations against Brazil.
The USTR report identified mainly six areas of concern:
Allegation | What the US claims |
Pix and digital trade | Favoring the national payment system to the detriment of American companies |
Ethanol | Loss of tariff reciprocity regarding American ethanol |
Intellectual property | Insufficient protection against piracy and slow patent approval |
Anti-corruption enforcement | Enforcement and accountability mechanisms considered ineffective |
Illegal deforestation | Distortion of international competition in agribusiness |
Market access | Barriers restricting the entry of American companies |
Pix and digital trade. The USTR claims that the Central Bank accumulates the roles of regulator and operator of the system, favoring Pix over American payment companies by requiring the service to be free for individuals, capping fees charged to businesses, and imposing mandatory visual prominence within banking apps.
Ethanol and preferential tariffs. According to the report, Brazil is said to have abandoned a previously balanced tariff treatment for American ethanol, no longer maintaining equivalence with the rates the United States itself applies to Brazilian ethanol.
Intellectual property. The document cites high piracy rates, Brazil's non-adherence to the WIPO Internet Treaties, and patent examination timelines considered roughly 30% longer than in the US, with particular emphasis on the biopharmaceutical sector.
Anti-corruption enforcement. The report questions the effectiveness of Brazil's enforcement and accountability mechanisms in practices that, according to the US, harm American companies operating in the country.
Illegal deforestation. Brazilian environmental enforcement and the expansion of deforested areas were cited as factors affecting international competition, particularly in agribusiness supply chains.
Market access. More broadly, the report argues that Brazilian practices restrict American companies' access to one of the world's largest markets.
One important caveat: this 25% tariff is not the same one announced in 2025 under the IEEPA and explicitly tied to the legal proceedings against former President Jair Bolsonaro. That measure was struck down by the US Supreme Court. The current 25% tariff rests on different legal grounds and involves allegations of a commercial, not political, nature.
The good news is that Washington preserved a broad list of exclusions, including civil aircraft, oil, natural gas, orange juice, pig iron, precious metals, pulp, fertilizers, graphite, kaolin, phosphates, ores, and beef.
The second layer: the additional 12.5%, based on forced labor
Two days later, on July 24, 2026, a second tariff took effect, this time at 12.5%, with a completely different origin.
This tariff stems from a separate investigation, also based on Section 301, but conducted across roughly 60 economies, to assess whether each country effectively maintains and enforces a ban on importing goods made with forced labor.
The USTR divided the countries investigated into two groups: those that committed to adopting and effectively enforcing such a ban, taxed at 10%, and those that, in the agency's assessment, did not, taxed at 12.5%. Brazil was placed in the second group.
The central allegation is that Brazil lacks a mechanism the United States considers effective against the importation of goods produced with forced labor, despite the country maintaining the "Dirty List" of slave labor, updated every six months by the federal government, and being a signatory to international conventions on the subject.
Since this tariff stacks, in most cases, on top of the 25% surcharge already in effect, a significant share of Brazilian exports now faces a combined burden of up to 37.5%.
The two tariffs don't share the same exclusions
This is the point most often overlooked, and the most important from a practical standpoint.
Each tariff has its own exclusion annex, built from a different investigation, with different criteria and its own tariff classification codes (HTSUS).
Tariff | Legal basis | Examples of excluded products |
25% | Section 301 — trade practices (Pix, ethanol, IP, corruption, deforestation) | Civil aircraft, oil, natural gas, orange juice, pig iron, precious metals, pulp, fertilizers, graphite, kaolin, phosphates, ores, beef |
12.5% | Section 301 — forced labor (60 economies) | Energy products, critical minerals, rare earths, food such as meat |
The two lists overlap in several respects, because the logic behind the exclusions is similar (essential raw materials the US doesn't produce). But they are not identical.
In practice, this means a product may be exempt from one tariff and not exempt from the other. The practical recommendation for any exporting company is: don't assume. It's necessary to check the product's HTSUS code against both annexes separately, as two distinct analyses.
What this means for companies in Goiás
Goiás has no port, so the direct impact doesn't arrive through maritime and customs channels as immediately as it does in coastal states. But the state has a relevant export mix to the United States, much of which was preserved by the exclusions under both measures.
The point that really deserves legal attention isn't just the tariff percentage, but who ends up paying for it under contracts already signed.
That depends directly on the Incoterms rules adopted in each transaction, on whether force majeure or hardship clauses exist, and on the possibility of reclassifying the tariff code of goods or using special customs regimes to mitigate the impact.
It's also worth reinforcing: an alarmist view should be avoided. The tariff situation certainly creates challenges and adds uncertainty to international trade, but the moment also opens room to diversify markets, strengthen logistics, and add value to products, expanding the competitiveness of companies in Goiás on the international stage.
Frequently asked questions
Do the 25% and 12.5% tariffs apply to the same product?
It depends on the product. Both tariffs have their own distinct exclusion lists. A product may be exempt from one and subject to the other, so the analysis must be done separately for each, based on the good's HTSUS code.
Is the 25% tariff the same one announced in 2025?
No. The tariff announced in 2025 was based on the IEEPA and was tied to the legal proceedings against former President Jair Bolsonaro. It was struck down by the US Supreme Court in February 2026. The 25% tariff currently in effect has a different legal basis (Section 301) and different allegations, of a commercial nature.
Who pays the tariff under an export contract already signed?
It depends on the contractual clauses, especially the Incoterm adopted. In some cases, the cost falls on the importer; in others, on the Brazilian exporter. Ongoing contracts should be reviewed individually to determine whether there's room for renegotiation or the application of force majeure clauses.
Is there any legal strategy to reduce the tariff's impact?
In certain cases, yes. Reviewing the tariff classification (NCM/HTSUS) of the goods and using special customs regimes can be evaluated, always based on a technical analysis of each transaction and each product.
Can Brazil retaliate against these tariffs?
The Brazilian government has signaled its intention to use the instruments provided by the Economic and Trade Reciprocity Law, approved by Congress, in addition to bringing the matter to the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism.
Watch the interview given to SBT Goiânia
Let's talk about the impact on your business
Companies exporting to the United States should not assume that a tariff applies, or doesn't apply, to their product. The analysis depends on the tariff classification, the exclusions provided in each annex, and, above all, the clauses already agreed upon in existing contracts.
A preventive review of these points tends to cost far less than dealing with the problem after it has already shown up on the invoice.
If your company exports to the United States and wants to understand precisely what changes in your contracts and pricing, I'm available to review the transaction in detail.
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About the author
Camila Hermano is a lawyer with more than 25 years of experience in business and international law. She holds a master's degree in International Law, Investment, Trade, and Arbitration from Heidelberg University (Germany) and Universidad de Chile (Chile), and advises Brazilian and foreign companies on internationalization, foreign trade, foreign investment, and international contracts.
